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Abstract 
 
When mediation places decision-making power in the hands of lay disputants it raises 
troubling issues.  Can justice be delivered without judicial assistance?  What is the 
effect on the legal system?  And how should outcomes thus achieved be regarded?  
Critics have tended to answer negatively, pointing to a range of harms including 
individual oppression and the vanishing trial.   
Such views, focusing too narrowly on conformity to legal norms, overlook ordinary 
people’s capacity for justice reasoning.  A recent Scottish pilot study of small claims 
mediation parties illustrates the richness and complexity of their thinking around 
whether, and for how much, to settle.  This suggests that mediation settlements,  
rather than representing second-class justice, may enhance the legitimacy of the legal 
system.  Implications for theories of justice are considered. 
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1) Introduction 
 
Mediation as a social process is elegantly simple: two people who disagree turn to a 
third for help.  Yet its adoption by contemporary Western justice systems raises 
complex questions: who is responsible for mediation outcomes and by which criteria 
should they be evaluated?   This article considers an important strand in current debates: 
how fair and how just are mediation outcomes?  Perhaps equally importantly: who is 
entitled to decide what constitutes justice?   
 
Much of the critical scholarship on mediation comes from the legal academy (see 
literature review at 2 below.)   Given lawyers’ key gatekeeping role in disputes this 
scholarship has been influential in fuelling scepticism about a process that places 
decision-making authority in the hands of ordinary people (Irvine, 2010).  Concern 
about non-lawyers’ ability to deliver just results seems to start early in a legal career.  
A first year law student wrote: ‘One of the major drawbacks of mediation is that lay 
people are in control of justice’ (Irvine, 2015).  Indeed.  A few months of legal 
education were clearly sufficient to set this this nascent professional apart from ‘lay’ 
people (Erlanger and Klegon, 1978). 
 
My purpose is not to re-run arguments about mediation’s superiority or inferiority to 
litigation.  Rather it is to draw attention to the reflex dismissal of non-lawyers’ capacity 
for justice.  Induction into the legal profession seems to efface the swathes of history, 
philosophy and literature (not to mention war) animated by the human sense of justice 
and injustice.  Ignorance of legal rules becomes ignorance, full stop.  The justice system 
can be considered a ‘regime of truth’  (establishing what is true, how to distinguish true 
from false and who has power to make that judgment) (Foucault 1980, cited in Shiner 
1982, 384).  ‘Those who occupy the lowest status in the various institutions and 
conditions of life – the patient, inmate, prisoner, welfare mother, labourer, student – all 
find their knowledge discounted’ (Shiner, 1982, 384). To this list could be added the 
lay litigant (Quintanilla, Allen and Hirt, 2017).   
 
How might we view the outcomes from a justice event in which the primary decision-
makers are not legally trained?  Rather than dismissing mediation as second class 
justice (Frey, 2000; McGregor, 2015), I propose extending the ambit of its promised 
empowerment and self-determination to include outcome justice.   First I review themes 
from the scholarly literature on mediation and justice, noting practical and 
philosophical concerns, before describing ADR developments in Scotland, one of the 
jurisdictions least receptive to such processes.  This article then draws on the early 
findings of an empirical study into the justice reasoning of lay mediation participants.  
The sample is small, but it is not the purpose of qualitative research to draw conclusions 
about wider populations.  It aims, rather, to explore complex and difficult questions in 
a way that is credible, authentic and critical (Whittemore, Chase and Mandle, 2001; 
Webley, 2010).  The participants shed new light on ordinary people’s thinking about 
fairness and justice.   
 
This article’s intention is twofold: first, to draw attention to the richness of lay people’s 
justice reasoning, countering its simplistic characterization as ‘subjective’ or self-
serving; second, to suggest that mediation outcomes resulting from that reasoning 
warrant serious consideration within the justice system.  That is not to say that they are 
immune from error or injustice, but rather that these decisions are generally animated 
by many of the same considerations judges apply in civil cases: fairness, retribution, 
restitution, proportionality, teaching someone a lesson and even making a public 
example of them (Maroney, 2012). 
 
I conclude that critiques of mediation’s justice capabilities have focussed too narrowly 
on conformity to legal norms, particularly given the impossibility of accurately 
evaluating outcomes without running a full trial (Menkel-Meadow, 2006).  A broader 
conception of justice, acknowledging non-legally qualified people’s interest in and 
capability for justice reasoning, is more likely to judge mediation on its own terms, as 
animated by principles of empowerment and self-determination.  Fuller asserted: ‘A 
serious study of mediation can serve, I suggest, to offset the tendency of modern 
thought to assume that all social order must be imposed by some kind of “authority”’ 
(1971, 315).  I will argue that mediation provides an alternative normative order by 
offering ordinary citizens a forum to negotiate not only the outcomes to their disputes 
but the criteria by which those outcomes are evaluated.  Natural law theory, rather than 
legal positivism, may provide a way of conceptualising results arrived at through 
human rationality.  
 
2) Mediation and Justice 
 
When mediation was first adopted by Western justice systems expansive claims were 
made regarding its benefits: it would be faster, less expensive and more inclusive; 
(Sander, 1985) more democratic (Bush and Folger, 1994; Mayer, 2012); gentler (Bok, 
1983); empowering (Beer and Packard, 2012); and help preserve relationships (Moore, 
1986; Haynes and Haynes, 1989).  It quickly spread across the USA, thanks in part to 
Sander’s (1985) vision of the ‘multi-door courthouse’. 
 
Such ringing endorsements provoked an inevitable backlash; around the same time a 
number of academic commentators held mediation up to a more critical light.  This 
wave of scholarship is captured in Abel’s (1982a) collection, ‘The Politics of Informal 
Justice,’ though others entered the fray (Nader, 1979; Auerbach, 1983; Fiss, 1984; 
Delgado, 1988; Luban, 1995).  Many of the scholars most critical of alternatives to the 
formal justice system were equally critical of the system itself, influenced by the critical 
legal studies movement.  Their arguments, most of which remain ‘largely 
unchallenged’ (Roberts and Palmer, 2005, 9) are set out below.   
 
At the heart of academic critiques lies the accusation that alternative forms of dispute 
resolution fail to deliver justice, providing instead: “poor justice to the poor” (Abel 
1982, cited in Cappelletti, 1993, 288, fn 19). More recently a prominent UK scholar 
asserted:  
 
It does not contribute to substantive justice because mediation requires the 
parties to relinquish ideas of legal rights during mediation and focus, instead, 
on problem-solving…. The outcome of mediation, therefore, is not about just 
settlement it is just about settlement [emphasis in original] (Genn, 2012a, 411).  
 
In assessing the purported justice of dispute resolution processes, the adversarial system 
and resultant judicial determinations tend to be presented as the gold standard (Nader, 
1979; Fiss, 1984; Luban, 1995).  Lawyer-negotiation, mainstay of the justice system, 
is tolerated as ‘bargaining in the shadow of the law’ (Mnookin and Kornhauser, 1979).  
Mediation, however, is portrayed as a rogue process: unregulated, private, informal and, 
potentially, unfair (Frey, 2000; Genn, 2012b).  Four persistent critiques can be 
identified in the literature: a) informalism, b) sources of norms, c) confusion of fairness 
and justice, and d) the distinction between procedural and substantive justice. 
 
a) Informalism 
 
The first wave of critical thinking about ADR tended not to distinguish mediation from 
other non-court processes such as arbitration; all were seen as ‘informal’.  While 
informality had its attractions, critics were quick to point out its drawbacks. 
 
i) Neutralising conflict. 
Nader argued that consumers were short-changed by informal processes, whose case-
by-case approach left systemic abuses by powerful corporate interests unchallenged 
and unscrutinised (Nader, 1979).  Others were concerned about losing the deterrent 
impact of such scrutiny (Singer, 1979; Budnitz, 1994).  Abel claimed: ‘informal 
institutions neutralize conflict by responding to grievances in ways that inhibit their 
transformation into serious challenges to the domination of state and capital’ (Abel, 
1982a, 280).  From this perspective, processes designed to reduce or resolve conflict 
play into the hands of elites whose interests lie in maintaining the status quo.  Similar 
concerns are voiced by those who see mediation aiding neo-liberal efforts to privatize 
and depoliticize the justice system (Resnik, 2002; Cohen, 2009a).  Such critiques come 
from the left, political home of the critical legal studies movement (Delgado et al., 
1985).  They raise questions of their own: must a process deliver social equality to be 
considered just? And is that standard applied to courts and tribunals? (Silbey, 2005) 
  
ii) Expanding the reach of the State 
Abel discerned a more sinister side-effect of well-intentioned efforts to empower 
communities through mediation.  Authorities could thereby ‘seek to review behavior 
that presently escapes state control’ (1982, 272).  Harrington (1982, 63) employed 
almost opposite logic to assert that referrals to mediation amounted to ‘delegalization’, 
expanding the reach of the state by removing these matters from judicial scrutiny.  
Others accused governments of seeking to co-opt mediation (Menkel-Meadow, 1991; 
Engle-Merry, 1993; Coy and Hedeen, 2005), although such views may underestimate 
mediation’s potential to support resistance to state power (Mulcahy, 2000). 
 
iii) Removing protection from the disadvantaged 
Critics were also concerned about the loss of procedural protections, claiming that 
informal processes ‘provide advantaged plaintiffs with a sword to enforce their rights 
while denying disadvantaged defendants an equivalent shield’ (Abel, 1982, 296).  
Engle-Merry observed judges and lawyers framing low value disputes as moral 
dilemmas, ‘offering lectures and social services rather than protections or punishment’ 
(1990, 1).  Grillo (1991) made a highly influential claim that mediation’s informality 
particularly disadvantages women and minorities (Menkel-Meadow, 1997).  Others 
have reached similar conclusions (Delgado et al., 1985; Noone and Ojelabi, 2014), 
although Reda (2010) distinguishes feminist critiques of mediation from ‘first wave’ 
critiques such as Abel’s in their focus on individuals rather than structure.  
 
iv) Loss of law 
Fiss added a further complaint about the loss of legal formality: we lose the benefit of 
public judgments in developing societal norms, ‘reducing the social function of the 
lawsuit to one of resolving private disputes’ (Fiss, 1984, 1085).  These sentiments have 
been echoed by scholars concerned about diluting the courts’ function in enunciating 
public norms (Luban, 1995; Weinstein, 1996; Resnik, 2002; Perschbacher and Bassett, 
2004, Cohen, 2009b).  Fiss’s arguments have been revived by UK academics (Genn, 
2012b; Mulcahy, 2013) and adopted by senior judiciary (Leveson, 2015; Lord Thomas 
of Cwmgiedd, 2015; Ryder, 2015). All deplore the potential harm caused by diverting 
cases to ADR and an ‘anti-adjudication and anti-law discourse’ (Genn, 2012a, 409).  
Genn’s views convinced the Scottish Civil Courts Review to limit judicial 
encouragement for mediation (Irvine, 2010). 
 
This argument follows a seam of US scholarship on the ‘Vanishing Trial’, even though 
its author concedes that the reduction in full hearings is ‘not confined to sectors or 
localities where ADR has flourished’ (Galanter, 2004, 519).  The vanishing trial has 
been critiqued for reflecting the justice industry’s prejudices: ‘Like medieval 
astronomers who mapped the Earth as being the center of the universe, most 
professionals in the legal system – including lawyers, judges, and legal scholars — 
place the courts in the center of the world of conflict resolution’(Lande, 2005, 199). 
 
This brief survey of the first wave of mediation critics highlights a range of issues 
bearing on justice and injustice: does mediation allow the powerful to evade scrutiny, 
bring government into more of our lives, work against the powerless and undermine a 
functional litigation system?  Two unarticulated premises seem to underpin them all: 
1)  The legally disadvantaged – lay, unrepresented, poorly educated or simply poor – 
lack the ability to assert their own needs and to produce results that are fair and just.  
This empirical question will be discussed in part 3. 
2) The courts are the appropriate source of normative authority to be applied in disputes. 
This is both a political and philosophical matter and will be discussed in the next 
section.  
 
b) Legitimate sources of norms in litigation and mediation 
 
In common law systems courts derive norms from two principal sources: legislation 
and judicial precedent.  Both claim authority.  Parliaments can point to their electoral 
mandate; courts to the logic of legal reasoning in real cases (although this has been 
questioned: Schauer, 2006).  In principle things are equally clear-cut for mediation.  
Norms pertaining to outcome come from the parties and the mediator’s role is confined 
to process (Haynes and Haynes, 1989; Mayer, 2012; Moore, 2014).  In this vision, 
whether a settlement is just or unjust is none of the mediator's business: the principle 
of self-determination leaves parties free to arrive at any outcome they choose (Stulberg, 
2005).  Scholars, however, have questioned the empirical reality (Greatbatch and 
Dingwall, 1989; Coben, 2004) and theoretical desirability (Rifkin, Millen and Cobb, 
1991; Astor, 2007; Mayer et al., 2012) of mediator neutrality.   
 
An alternative approach would be to see mediators as a potential source of normative 
guidance. Riskin contrasts the ‘facilitative’ style, where mediators assume parties can 
solve their own problems given a helpful process, with the ‘evaluative’ style, where 
mediators with legal expertise believe their evaluation will help parties achieve 
settlement (Riskin, 1996, 2005).. The evaluative/facilitative debate has had huge 
resonance within the mediation community (Wall and Chan-Serafin, 2014; Rubinson, 
2016).  An alternative view is that wider social norms guide parties’ decision-making 
(Waldman, 1997; Belhorn, 2005).  Waldman divides mediators into ‘norm-generating’ 
(‘disputants… generate the norms that will guide the resolution to their dispute’) (p. 
708), ‘norm-educating’ (mediators provide normative guidance but parties ultimately 
decide) (p. 727) and ‘norm-advocating’ (mediators ensure outcomes conform to legal 
or regulatory norms) (p. 745).  Both Riskin and Waldman acknowledge that mediators 
may change style from context to context, suggesting a situational dimension to any 
mediator guidance. 
 
Some see legal information or advice as the guarantee of informed consent (Nolan-
Haley, 1999; Korobkin, 2005).  For others this is impractical and wrong: if anything 
trumps self-determination, even the mediator’s sense of fairness or justice, party 
autonomy is compromised (Stulberg, 1998; Bush and Folger, 2005).  A key 
battleground in these debates is the appropriate source of normative guidance in 
mediation.  Scholars have tended to assume that such guidance can only come from the 
‘juridical field,’ characterised by Bourdieu as ‘the site of competition for monopoly of 
the right to determine the law’ (1987 p. 817).  It includes judges, lawyers and jurists: 
‘an entire social universe which is in practice relatively independent of external 
determinations and pressures’ (p. 816).  It may conceivably include lawyer mediators 
providing evaluative guidance. 
 
Little attention has been paid to parties themselves: what weight, if any, should be 
granted to their justice judgments?  Do they look to mediators to inform them about 
social and legal norms?  Or do they see themselves as best placed to select the standards 
by which mediation outcomes should be evaluated?  Put more simply, can we, should 
we and do we trust lay people to decide what is fair and just? 
 
c) Justice and fairness 
 
i) Etymology 
Much of the discussion above employs the terms fairness and justice interchangeably. 
Yet the two English words have distinct tones of meaning.  ‘Justice’ derives from 
French and Latin, languages of the King and the court, of authority and officialdom.  
‘Fairness’, on the other hand, is a Norse word originating in the visual qualities of a 
longboat’s ‘fair’ payload (Wilson and Wilson, 2006).  It is everyday and self-evident, 
not dissimilar to reasonableness (Wheeler, 2014).  Anyone may have a view on fairness, 
whereas justice embodies the means by which the state applies and enforces the law: it 
is the prime Aristotelian virtue (Reid, 2008),  the ‘virtue of the magistrate’ (Aristotle, 
no date). Fairness, then, is ‘bottom-up,’ a universal urge but subjective standard; justice 
is ‘top-down,’ emanating from societal elites yet aspiring to set universal standards.   
 
Most have little difficulty in accepting that ordinary people understand fairness, while 
regarding justice as the domain of legal professionals (a view echoed in Bourdieu’s 
(1987) critique of the juridical field).  Little wonder, then, that critics express concern 
when legal systems adopt processes allowing lay people to determine outcomes, a role 
hitherto reserved for state-appointed judges.    
 
ii) Criteria for evaluating justice and fairness 
Some scholars see litigation as the benchmark for the quality of justice achieved in 
mediation (Sabatino, 1998; Frey, 2000); others see the two processes as alternatives, 
justice in court coming from ‘above’, mediation being more ‘horizontal’ (Hyman and 
Love, 2002, 160) or ‘justice from below’ (Stulberg, 2005, 5).  A related debate asks 
whether mediators should tilt the justice playing field to protect the ostensibly less 
powerful party.  Responses range from not at all (Stulberg, 2012); through a relatively 
thin vision where mediators intervene where agreements ‘are so one-sided and unfair 
that they shock the conscience’ (Waldman and Ojelabi, 2016, 423); to acceptance of 
mediator influence to ensure compliance with legal norms (Carmichael, 2013).  Like 
their critics, those defending mediation’s fairness credentials appear to echo ‘the 
complacent assumption among jurists that state law is the most influential source of 
normative order in society’ (Tamanaha, 2019, 173).   
 
Even where attention is paid to non-legal norms the mediator is often presented as 
guarantor of fairness, while parties’ views are characterised as subjective (Hyman, 
2014, 34) or merely the opinions of ‘lay’ people (Schwartz, 1999; Shestowsky and 
Brett, 2008).   Colatrella proposes twin standards: first, an outcome ‘is "fair" if the 
participants deem it acceptable’; second, the mediator must find it ‘sufficiently and 
substantively fair too’ (2014, 715). Waldman differentiates ‘self-determination 
theorists’ from ‘social norm theorists’, the latter less optimistic about human capacity 
to reach just decisions and more concerned about inequality and power (2004, 250).   
 
d) Procedural and substantive justice 
 
Genn’s complaint about mediation focused on its capacity to deliver ‘substantive 
justice’ (Genn, 2012a, 411).   This describes the outcome of a process; the fairness of 
the process itself is known as procedural justice.  Across multiple cultures and contexts 
procedural justice is a more reliable predictor of party satisfaction than substantive 
justice (Brockner et al., 2001; Lind, 2001; MacCoun, 2005; Solum, 2005; Tyler, 2006; 
Bollen, Ittner and Euwema, 2012; Nolan-Haley and Annor-Ohene, 2014).  Despite 
critiques of its conclusions on the grounds of confirmation bias (Silbey, 2005), 
attribution errors (Collett, 2008) and research design (Creutzfeldt and Bradford, 2016) 
this research offers evidence of what people value in dispute resolution processes: 
i. Voice: the opportunity to present views, concerns and evidence to a third party 
(Brockner et al., 2001; Lind and Arndt, 2017)  
ii. Being heard: the perception that the ‘third party considered their views, 
concerns and evidence’ (Welsh, 2001, 820)  
iii. Treatment: dignified and even-handed (MacCoun, 2005). 
Unsuccessful litigants are more likely to rate themselves satisfied when they believe 
they have been fairly treated: ‘fair procedures are a cushion of support against the 
potentially damaging effects of unfavourable outcomes’ (Tyler, 2006, 101). Welsh 
(2001) believes mediation can offer a procedurally fair experience, leading parties to 
feel valued and respected. 
 
e) Conclusion: a critical response to the critics 
 
These scholarly debates should give pause to even the most starry-eyed mediation 
enthusiasts.  A recurring concern is that participants with the least bargaining power 
will end up with ‘less’ than they would have received from a judge.  Does this mean 
that mediation should not be practised when one party is disadvantaged in some way?  
How would disadvantage be measured?  Below average income?  Failing to attain a 
certain educational level? The range of potential disadvantages could include gender, 
cultural heritage and structural factors like occupying a lower place in an organisational 
hierarchy (Delgado et al., 1985; Seth, 2000). 
 
One contextual factor often overlooked by mediation’s critics is that those with least 
power and resource are also unlikely to fare well in the courts (Wexler, 1970; Sarat, 
1990).  It is not simply a matter of income poverty: Galanter famously set out the range 
of practical and systemic challenges faced by ‘one-shotters’ pitched against ‘repeat 
players’ in litigation, severely limiting the courts’ redistributive capacity (1974, 97).  
Sandefur (2008) identified a range of complex, interrelated factors limiting poor 
people’s successful use of legal institutions, including social status, feelings of 
disentitlement and previous negative experiences. Studies highlight the impact of poor 
or no representation on outcomes (Seron et al., 2001; Yoon, 2009; Quintanilla, Allen 
and Hirt, 2017).   In an imperfect world mediation may deliver less than perfect justice; 
but so may litigation and other processes touched by the logic of the market.   
 
The notion of  obtaining ‘less’ raises further problems.  By what criteria should outcome 
be evaluated?  And by whom?  To ensure the disadvantaged do not do worse than at 
trial, a mediator would require a judge’s legal knowledge and the means to take 
evidence under oath and probe competing accounts.  One may as well run the trial.   
 
And if the mediator does tilt the playing field to protect the ostensibly weaker party, 
inescapably she tilts it against the other party.  Mediation’s critics have paid little 
attention to ‘advantaged’ participants; here again, how to measure advantage?  Rhetoric 
on this issue often juxtaposes a poor, unrepresented individual with a major utility or 
multinational bank.  But legal claims can equally involve two small businesses; or a 
self-employed tradesperson and a retired professional couple; or an SME in financial 
difficulty and a late-paying customer.  Who is disadvantaged and, once again, who 
should decide?  More pragmatically, if mediators make efforts to support one party, 
how will the other party view a process that claims to be consensual yet seems weighted 
against them?  Mediation’s credibility is unlikely to be enhanced by moves depriving 
one of its participants of even-handed treatment, a key dimension of procedural justice. 
 
Most problematic of all is that the ‘less’ critique fails to judge mediation on its own 
terms.  Mediation claims to empower participants to make informed choices.  This goes 
beyond simple preference: mediators generally invite people to choose not only the 
outcome to their dispute but the criteria by which that outcome is evaluated (Waldman, 
1997).  This complex form of thinking involves finely-tuned judgements about personal 
and community norms as well as factors like expectation, risk, commitment and 
personal resources. Little attention has been paid to that thinking.   
 
Mediation scholarship appears to have fallen into the habit of assuming that ‘lay’ 
people’s lack of legal knowledge effaces their capacity for thinking about substantive 
justice.  Studies involving participants tend to focus on factors such as satisfaction, 
improved relationship and procedural justice (Wissler et al., 2002; Eisenberg, 2016; 
Charkoudian, Eisenberg and Walter, 2017).  Where substantive justice is considered, 
the views of lawyers predominate (Genn et al., 2007), fulfilling Bourdieu’s prediction 
that the juridical field maintains its monopoly through ‘the disqualification of the non-
specialists' sense of fairness’ (1987, p. 828).   
 
It is thus timely to investigate the thinking of non-legal actors in disputes where they 
are the decision-makers.  Small claims, with its preponderance of unrepresented parties, 
provides an ideal setting.  The study described below took place with people referred 
to mediation in Scotland’s civil courts.  The research question is: ‘What is the place of 
justice in the thinking of small claims mediation participants?’  
  
3) The study 
 
Scotland 
 
Scotland is an unusual jurisdiction.  A nation with a thousand year history (Davis 1999, 
263-5), union with England in 1707 meant that for almost 300 years Scotland had its 
own legal system 2  without its own legislature (Smith, 1970) until 1999, when the 
Scottish Parliament was re-established.  Its highest civil court is in London.  Scots law, 
with roots in European canon and civil law (Reid, 2008), has thus been overlaid with 
judicial decisions reflecting the English common law tradition and is now generally 
categorised as a ‘mixed’ legal system (Reid, 2003; but see Osler, 2007).  
 
Scotland also stands apart from a striking recent development across the common law 
world: the growth in ADR (King et al., 2014).  Despite the passage of the Arbitration 
(Scotland) Act 2010 only 22 arbitrations took place between July 2013 and June 2014 
 
2 Along with its own education system and national church: Union with Scotland Act 1707. 
in a country of 5.4 million people (Auchie et al., 2015).  And after positive early 
endorsement of family mediation, including confidentiality legislation (Civil Evidence 
(Family Mediation) (Scotland) Act 1995), judges and much of the legal profession have 
shown indifference or hostility towards general civil mediation (Ross, 2006; Ross and 
Bain, 2010; Clark, 2011).  In contrast to the Woolf reforms in England and Wales, the 
last major review of Scottish civil justice rejected judicial encouragement for ADR 
(Report of the Scottish Civil Courts Review, 2009, 172-3; Irvine, 2010).  Mediation is 
attempted in less that 1% of non-family civil litigation (Civil Justice Statistics in 
Scotland 2015-16, 62).  A senior Scottish judge (now on the UK Supreme Court) 
typifies judicial attitudes: ‘it would not be right to require persons who wish a legal 
solution of their dispute to participate in a process which is far from pure in its 
application of legal principle’ (Lord Reed 2007, cited in Irvine, 2012).   
 
Nonetheless some within the justice system favour greater use of ADR.  In 2013 the 
Law Society issued guidance to the effect that solicitors should be able to advise clients 
on ADR options (Law Society of Scotland, Guidance in relation to Rules B1.4, B1.9: 
Dispute Resolution).  Scotland’s Employment Tribunals have offered judicial 
mediation since 2009.  A small claims mediation scheme has existed in Edinburgh 
Sheriff Court since 1998.  And in 2016 new rules came into force requiring judges to 
encourage ADR in actions of up to £5,000 (Act of Sederunt (Simple Procedure) 2016, 
SSI 2016/200), a significant and surprising innovation (Irvine, 2016).  
 
What lies in the future for ADR in Scotland is hard to predict.  The simple procedure 
rules were followed by similar encouragement for ADR in commercial actions (Court 
of Session Practice Note 1 of 2017 – Commercial Actions, 11).  Yet this is absent from 
the general civil procedure rules (Scottish Civil Justice Council, 2017) and a 2013 
review of the costs of litigation managed to avoid a single reference to ADR in its 334 
pages (Taylor, 2013).  There is evidence that wider debates about the efficacy and 
fairness of ADR have influenced Scottish policymakers (Irvine, 2010).  There has, 
however, been a notable lack of empirical research into mediation in Scotland’s civil 
justice system. 
 
To address this gap I initiated a qualitative study of small claims mediation in Glasgow 
and Edinburgh Sheriff Courts.  The pilot phase took place in 2016 under the older, 
Small Claims, rules. Sheriffs (judges) referred cases to mediation at a procedural 
hearing; parties were encouraged but not compelled to take part.  The full study, 
including parties referred to mediation under the new Simple Procedure rules, is 
currently underway.      
 
Methodology 
 
A philosophical difficulty is engendered by applying social science methods to matters 
falling within law’s domain.  Law seeks to provide a normative system applicable to 
everyday life (McCoubrey and White, 1996).  It is prescriptive.  Its epistemology is 
deductive, enabling those skilled in its methods to deduce what is just in particular 
situations (Halpin, 2006).   
 
Justice is both a psychological and legal concern.  However, insofar as courts and other 
legal actors seek binding rules from justice events they engage in a form of ontological 
transformation (Teubner, 1989): subjective judgements about disputes become sources 
applicable across whole societies and, in the process, acquire objectivity.  The doctrine 
of legal precedent crystallises this transformation, providing a public good argument 
for dispute resolution via courts: ‘from the moment a body of precedents is formed, an 
unlimited number of individuals can make use of this legal corpus and derive from it 
the entire diversity of attendant utilities' (Bilsky and Fisher, 2014, 82).  The doctrine of 
legal positivism, seeing law as rules, reinforces the idea that justice can only come from 
official sources (Farrell, 2006; Dwyer, 2008; Samuel, 2009). 
 
Social science, whether realist or idealist, tends to reject normativity in favour of 
description.  Its epistemology is inductive (Ritchie et al., 2014): phenomena need to be 
observed prior to the development of theory and principles.  The constructivist turn sees 
the social world as produced by social interaction, and subject to revision (Grix, 2010).  
Thus the empirical study of legal matters faces a challenge that is both principled and 
practical: how to avoid diminishing either law’s deductive, normative approach or the 
inductive, descriptive tradition of the social sciences.  Legal scholars run the risks of a 
closed system, uncorrected by empirical data.  And social scientists risk discounting 
legal ontology, missing law’s normative intentions (Pavlakos, 2004).  The study 
described in this article can be located within empirical legal studies (Menkel-Meadow 
2006; Hillyard 2007; Webley 2010; Epstein and Martin 2014), defined as “the study 
through direct methods of the operation and impact of law and legal processes in 
society” (Genn, Partington and Wheeler, 2006, 3). 
 
The complexity of the research question (examining both justice and thinking about 
justice) lends itself to a qualitative approach: semi-structured interviews (King, 2004;  
Ritchie et al., 2014, 4).  In this interpretive tradition reality is viewed as subjective, and 
mediated by senses and consciousness.   Language does not simply describe the world 
but shapes our view of what can exist.  Meaning is not discovered; it is constructed by 
"interaction between consciousness and the world… truth is a consensus formed by co-
constructors" (Scotland 2012, p.12).  Interviews explored the life history of disputes, 
from their inception in ‘naming, blaming and claiming’ (Felstiner, Abel and Sarat, 
1981) through the raising of court action and the experience of mediation to resolution 
or otherwise.  
 
Participants were individuals taking part in small claims mediation in Scotland’s two 
largest courts (Glasgow and Edinburgh Sheriff Courts).  During the pilot phase I 
conducted five face-to-face interviews.  None of the cases had a value greater that 
£3,000. Three concerned unpaid bills, one goods and services and one a 
landlord/property agent dispute.  Three settled and two did not.  Three participants were 
male and two female.  None was legally represented in mediation, although one 
employed a lawyer for court hearings.   
 
Interviews lasted an average of 46 minutes and were semi-structured.   They were 
recorded, transcribed, then analysed using thematic analysis (Miles, Huberman and 
Saldana, 2014).  The goal of this approach is to build theory rather than to test it, so as 
to remain open to new insights emerging from the data (Ajjawi and Higgs, 2007).      
 
 Findings  
 
These are grouped in themes and illustrated by extracts from the data.  Four follow 
justice issues identified in the literature review: procedural justice, fairness and justice 
(goals), fairness and justice (evaluation) and the limitations of mediation.  A fifth, 
unanticipated, theme emerged and is included for its explanatory power in relation to 
mediation’s success: participants’ self-presentation.   
 
a) Procedural justice 
 
Researchers have generally been willing to cede to lay people the capacity to determine 
the fairness of a process (as distinct from its outcome): most procedural justice research 
is conducted with non-lawyers (see 2(d) above).  Before examining substantive justice, 
it is valuable to consider whether participants believed they had been fairly treated; 
Welsh (2002) sees this as a baseline or minimum standard for mediation.   
 
These Scottish participants appeared to believe their voice had been heard. One said:  
‘It gave me an opportunity to put my point across.’   
 
However, being heard by the mediator was less important than being heard by their 
opponent:  
‘It gave an opportunity cos, prior to that point, you, you’re not having 
conversations directly with the other party.’ 
‘I can’t remember who spoke first but we both did speak and we spoke quite a 
lot, you know what I mean.’3 
 
This runs counter to much procedural justice research, where the legitimacy of a process 
turns on the behaviour of an authority figure/decision-maker (though see Nesbit, 
 
3 Unless indicated otherwise all quotations are from individuals who were also pursuers (plaintiffs). 
Nabatchi and Bingham, 2012, for a similar finding).  In a process where parties are 
themselves decision-makers fairness may depend more on the opportunity to be heard 
by one’s counterpart.     
 
b) Fairness and justice – goals 
 
Respondents were asked about their goals for raising or defending a small claim. Their 
answers reveal a wide range of considerations, including pragmatism, principle, 
complaints handling, risk, hassle, precedent and even the public interest, similar to 
those of represented parties in Relis’s (2007) study of Canadian medical negligence 
mediation.   
 
For example, one participant appeared to have some form of precedent in mind: 
‘Those judgements collectively, if they’re used properly, can actually improve 
things.’ 
 
A business defender, whose case had not settled, spoke of the importance of good 
complaints handling: 
‘You know, kind of… are we being responsible?  Have we been professional?  
Because sometimes we do things wrong and if we do things wrong I think that 
it’s fair that we have to offer some form of compensation for it.’  
 
Another participant reflected a principle embedded in Scots law: restitution, where a 
person harmed by another is restored to the position they would otherwise have 
enjoyed: 
‘I’m quite happy to take… not be out of pocket from what I intended.’  
 
c) Fairness and justice – evaluation 
 
At the heart of the research lies the question of substantive justice: did lay people see 
the mediation outcome as fair and/or just?  Interviews employed both terms given their 
rather different meanings (see 2 (c) i above).  As well as discussing fairness, participants 
were asked the direct question, ‘Did you get justice?’  One woman, who settled for 
considerably less than she claimed, replied:  
‘I think I got more than justice.  I think I got, em… I don’t want to say teach 
him a lesson but, you know he, he needed to learn that he can’t just get away 
with things.’ 
 
This statement reflects not so much a punitive motivation as a didactic one: people learn 
lessons from justice events and the financial penalty drives the lesson home.   
  
If the other party was seen as particularly blameworthy, for example a professional who 
should adhere to higher standards, the punitive motivation was fiercer: 
‘I’d actually said to the lawyer… look even if this costs me £5000 it doesn’t 
matter because what they have done is despicable… And this woman’s a 
lawyer, she should know better. Well, had she been a lay person, I might have 
taken a different view.’ 
 
This response echoes findings that medical negligence claimants sought a large 
monetary award not (or not only) for compensation but to punish and deter errant 
doctors (Relis, 2009).   
 
At the same time a distinctive feature of mediation is that outcomes are consensual.  No 
matter how strongly one party feels they must also convince the other to settle.  The 
punitive urge could thus be tempered by pragmatism and a sense of reasonableness:  
‘Did I feel that he could have gone a bit further?  Well, I took a view – it’s 
reasonable we’re meeting in the middle, can he be squeezed any more?  And 
knowing [Defender] I thought, well, you could well squeeze him and he’ll go 
the other way.  So a bird in the hand…’ 
 
‘… there was justice.  Absolute justice, if there is such a term, would have been 
that I would have got the full amount.’ 
 
 
Unsurprisingly mediators played a part in brokering these settlements.  One response 
chimes with US research revealing mediators’ focus on lowering client aspirations 
(Wall and Kressel, 2017): 
‘…the only reason I think anyone would accept a vastly reduced sum, because 
that’s what it is, in mediation would be because the mediator’s saying, look, 
when you go to court, it’s a 50/50, there’s no guarantees (LAUGHS) one way 
or the other… and it’s probably not worth the aggro...  You’d be as well 
accepting it.’ 
 
This excerpt illustrates the complex decision-making unrepresented people face in 
mediation.  They must juggle their sense of how much they are entitled to, the practical 
challenges they face in recovering it (‘the aggro’), the risk of failure (‘no guarantees’) 
and the effort already expended in getting the other party to offer anything at all – the 
sunk costs of time spent on the case.   
 
One source of the concern that lay people will settle for ‘less’ is the view that natural 
sympathies will cloud their judgment in ways to which judges are inured (Maroney, 
2011).  Participants did demonstrate signs of empathy, but responses indicate a careful 
weighing up of competing factors rather than a straightforward emotional reaction.   
‘I felt he was quite vulnerable and he was quite… he’d just got a, a new baby 
and… I just thought, well, he’s learned his lesson basically, he’ll not do that in 
a hurry again.’ 
 
Another described how the Defenders, a medium sized company, had sent a young 
graduate to represent them.  Apparently this influenced his decision to mediate: 
‘I thought – this lad’s wet behind the ears, this could be a good thing to go for 
it (LAUGHS).’ 
 
Such tactical considerations may seem unconnected to either fairness or justice, but will 
be recognisable to legal professionals versed in the idea of litigation as a game 
(Galanter, 1974; Bok, 1983).  Unrepresented people can also take a strategic view of 
dispute resolution processes. 
 
d) Mediation’s limitations 
 One participant with a positive view of the outcome nonetheless spoke of wishing for 
a more public setting.   
‘…one slight regret I’ve got on that moral issue of somebody challenging their 
terms and conditions and such like in court and getting them to understand it… 
there was a lack of, em, ombudsman type services that could have done a quasi-
legal review… there was this jump from the one to one, sort of, between myself 
and the company… then the next redress had to be at the small claims level 
rather than at a level beneath.  And that was a gap I felt…’ 
 
This small claimant echoes concerns about ADR’s privacy and the loss of a public 
declaration of norms (2(a) above).  He suggests that an ombudsman scheme, a ‘level 
beneath’ the courts, could ensure that companies are publicly named and shamed to 
discourage them from repeating offending behaviour.  While this perspective highlights 
a troubling issue for mediation, it underlines the point that ‘lay’ people’s justice 
reasoning extends beyond their immediate interests. 
 
e) Fairness and justice – self-presentation 
 
As well as reporting what is said, qualitative research emphasises the work language is 
doing: ‘the world is made, not found’ (Pearce, 2006, 7).  Respondents do not simply 
relate objective facts; they co-construct, with the interviewer, a version of reality that 
may fulfil other purposes.  This was evident in participants’ statements about the 
fairness of their own actions:   
‘I said, this is where I will meet and I said, I think this is fair.  I said, I will meet 
in the middle and it’s £500.’ 
 
‘It’s made me feel as if I’m, eh, quite a nice person, to be quite honest with you.  
I’m fair… it’s my personal position, you know what I mean.  I, I dislike social 
injustice.  I really dislike it.  So I’m quite thingmy4 on things like that.’ 
 
‘I didn’t chase them for the 5 hours delay.  I chased them for the extra cost 
beyond that which…  which had been incurred.’ 
 
Here the respondent demonstrates his own fairness by describing what he could have 
sued for but didn’t.  Mediators often hear this sort of self-justification.  It speaks of the 
need to be seen as fair, not only by others, but also in one’s own self-image; these may 
be factors in the eventual outcome.   
 
Participants tended to provide arguments for evaluating their own behaviour, 
potentially attempting to convince the interviewer (‘the tribunal of the man without’) 
and perhaps themselves (‘the tribunal of the man within’) (Smith, 1759/1976, 130-131) 
of their fairness.  They were thus not only evaluating the outcome but also their own 
contribution to it, and answering a question not put to them: ‘what kind of person are 
you?’  This species of question has been found particularly influential in motivating 
people to participate in mediation (Sikveland and Stokoe, 2016, 247).  It may play an 
equally strong role in achieving settlement.  By the time disputes reach the courts 
 
4 ‘Thingmy’ is Scottish slang, used when a person cannot find the right word.  It can therefore mean more or less 
anything.  Here I took it to mean ‘strict’ or ‘firm’. 
parties may not care what their adversary thinks, but probably want to be seen in a good 
light by the mediator (despite claims of impartiality).  Clearly they also want to see 
themselves in a good light. 
 
f) What do the findings tell us? 
 
These findings contradict the idea of mediation as simple horse-trading between two 
financial positions; rather it is a complex web of factors and people.  In the next section 
I propose ways of conceptualising ordinary people’s justice reasoning. 
 
4) Discussion: how might we account for lay people’s answers to questions about 
justice in mediation? 
 
a) The Social Construction of Fairness and Justice 
 
Ordinary citizens faced with the opportunity to negotiate substantive outcomes to their 
disputes described a wide range of criteria to explain or justify their decisions.  These 
included: recompense for loss; punishment of bad behaviour; teaching someone a 
lesson (deterring future poor behaviour);  holding businesses to account; pragmatism 
(how far the other party can be pushed); risk of further proceedings; empathy for the 
other party; reasonableness; and the urge to be, or be seen to be, a fair person.   
 
In the diagram below this complex matrix of decision-making is conceptualised as a 
multi-party negotiation.  Parties negotiate with the mediator; the other party; their 
supporters; the wider community; and, to an extent, themselves.  All of these 
conversations may be one-way (monologue) two-way (dialogue) or include three or 
more parties (facilitated dialogue); and may be private or public.  Wider society is also 
shown.  One practice model, narrative mediation (Winslade and Monk, 2002), overtly 
acknowledges the impact of societal discourse on possible outcomes.    
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Matrix of Fairness and Justice Negotiation
In this negotiation process, as in real-world litigation, fairness is not fixed.  It is a social 
construction (Macfarlane, 2001; Paul and Dunlop, 2014) refined through discourse: the 
interaction provided by the mediation setting.  Court judgments are also socially 
constructed (Silbey, 2005; Schauer, 2006; Finnis, 2011).  Judges often disagree in 
significant cases and minority reports present plausible counter-arguments.  Judicial 
opinions are addressed as much to the wider legal system as to litigants.   
 
Judges, however, are disinterested participants in legal disputes.  By contrast, the model 
above presents mediation as a multi-party negotiation involving interested parties 
(litigants, representatives, supporters) and a disinterested facilitator (the mediator).  
Does this prevent it from arriving at just outcomes?  While the results have been 
characterised as ‘subjective’ (see 2, C, ii above), Seul (2004) argues that negotiated 
settlements are capable of producing outcomes that are as just, from a societal 
viewpoint, as those produced by trials. Sturm proposes that court-ordered conflict 
resolution by non-legal actors can result in ‘efficient, fair, and workable norms’ (2005, 
p. 50). 
 
b) Implications for Theories of Justice 
 
Justice overlaps with, but is not identical to, legality (Gardner, 2018).  While the 
‘shadow of the law’ plays an important part in lawyer negotiation (Mnookin and 
Kornhauser, 1979) justice exists outside the legal system.  Society could not function 
if the courts had to be consulted on every decision touching on fairness and justice, and 
the adversarial system has long encouraged negotiated settlements (Galanter, 1988).  
Mediation parties may indeed be ill-informed about legal rules; participants in the 
present study made little mention of the law.  They appealed to ethical or moral norms: 
holding bad behaviour to account; achieving restitution; teaching the offender a lesson; 
behaving fairly; discouraging others from behaving badly.  They also displayed tactical 
awareness (not unlike legal practitioners): exploiting inexperience, not provoking 
resistance, assessing the costs and benefits of continuing the dispute. 
 
Alasdair MacIntyre once complained that academic philosophy had become so 
complex most people believed it had nothing to offer them: ‘The attempted 
professionalization of serious and systematic thinking has had a disastrous effect upon 
our culture’ (1988, x).  That accusation could equally be levelled at law and lawyers.  
The professionalization of serious and systematic thinking about justice is not a new 
endeavour (Pound, 1944), but it may blind us to other sites of justice reasoning.   
 
Critical work on ADR, emanating largely from the legal academy, tends to replicate the 
hierarchical structure of the justice system itself: ‘superior’ courts at the top, supported 
by a pyramid of appellate and ordinary courts; below them another pyramid of legal 
professionals; at the bottom ‘lay’ people (Kennedy, 1982; Arthurs, 1985). Those 
people’s capacity for serious and systematic thinking, or indeed any thinking about 
justice, is generally regarded through a lens of paternalistic concern.  Raz noted law’s 
claim to ‘provide the general framework for all aspects of social life’ (1975, 154).  In 
this view, if non-lawyers do think about justice it is only to advance their own cause or 
avoid trouble.   
 
The law’s hierarchical logic may derive from another era when its purpose was ‘to 
ensure deference by the lower orders to the world-view of the higher’ (Arthurs, 1985, 
6).  Galanter also notes ‘the pretensions of the official law to stand in a relationship of 
hierarchic control to other normative orderings in society’ (1981, 20).  It seems oddly 
out of step with contemporary democratic societies where each vote carries equal 
weight and little deference remains.  Mediation’s early pioneers made great play of its 
egalitarian and democratic credentials (Menkel-Meadow, 1991, 6).  Critics, however, 
have tended to portray this as naïve, warning that empowering ordinary people to make 
their own decisions would simply lead to exploitation of the vulnerable (see 2 (a) ii 
above).  The idea that lay people might be capable of producing just results seems not 
to have occurred to them, far less that those results may have derived from a set of 
norms that includes, but is not limited to, the law.  
 
This may be because jurisprudence, the theory of law, struggles to account for ‘bottom-
up’ normativity.  The hierarchical universe set out by Arthurs is evident within legal 
positivism with its efforts to derive rules from a ‘basic norm’ (Kelsen, 1967, 46) or 
‘ultimate rule of recognition’ (Hart, 1961, 100).  One of legal positivism’s avowed goals 
is to keep law separate from everyday moral reasoning, to study what law is rather than 
what it ought to be (Kelsen, 1934, 477).  Non-lawyers’ views about fairness and justice 
are thus rendered interesting but irrelevant. 
 
The ancient natural law tradition may prove more apt in conceptualising lay people’s 
thinking about justice.  The idea of discerning how just the law is goes back at least to 
the time of Plato (Rommen, 1936/1998), but it was the Roman jurist Cicero who most 
clearly articulated the role of human reason in this endeavour:  
True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, 
unchanging and everlasting; … We cannot be freed from its obligations by 
senate or people, and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or 
interpreter of it (1961, III, xxii). 
 
Cicero sees law as deriving from everyday moral reasoning rather than superior to it.  
Later natural law theory is associated with religion, but rationality remained central.  
Scots Law’s founding father, Viscount Stair, declared ‘Law is the dictate of reason’ 
(Stair, 1681, 1, 1, 1).  As Europe secularised following the Enlightenment the role of 
reason in justice was articulated afresh.  Adam Smith saw our sense of justice as innate 
and mysterious: ‘somehow or other, we feel ourselves to be in a peculiar manner tied, 
bound and obliged to the observation of justice’ (1759/1976, 80).  Later natural lawyers 
lend support to the idea that moral reasoning about justice precedes rather than derives 
from legal rules.  Fuller refers to ‘the morality that makes law possible’ (1969, 89).  
 
This article does not seek to revisit the complex debate between natural law theory and 
legal positivism.  A natural law approach, however, does have potential in accounting 
for the role of justice in mediation.  It links reason and justice and brings both to bear 
in evaluating substantive legal rules (as do contemporary lawyers, claims Gordon, 
1999).  It seems a good fit with mediation models which place the parties as decision-
makers and express faith in human rationality (Irvine, 2007).  Other approaches may 
also prove fruitful, such as identity theory (Stets and Osborn, 2008), the notion of moral 
community (Deutsch, 2014) or Gilligan’s (1982) ethic of care/ethic of justice 
dichotomy.  
 
C) Limitations 
 
The small sample means further investigation is needed to test its conclusions (the full 
study of 24 participants is underway).  Scotland’s new Simple Procedure rules mandate 
greater judicial encouragement for alternative dispute resolution (Scottish Statutory 
Instruments, 2016).  Thus they create ideal conditions for enriching our understanding 
of ordinary people’s thinking about a justice event in which they are primary decision-
makers.   Further research should examine non-lawyers’ thinking about justice in other 
contexts and cultures.   
 
6) Conclusion 
 
Scotland provides a distinctive backdrop for the empirical study of mediation and 
justice.  Its legal institutions have until now provided little encouragement for 
alternatives to litigation.  It is therefore a useful setting in which to consider the 
perspectives of mediation participants with few preconceptions and a distinct lack of 
lawyer briefing. 
 
Despite Genn’s (2012a) ringing dismissal of mediation as having anything to do with 
justice, the concept is central to much mediation and conflict resolution literature.  The 
formal justice system is a key battleground, with critics alleging the process dilutes 
cherished values like the right to a fair trial while appearing to empower individuals.  
While lay people’s views have been widely canvassed on procedural justice, 
researchers have tended to leave substantive justice to lawyers.  Genn et al’s (2007) 
study devotes nine pages to lawyers’ views on mediation and three to those of the 
parties.  
 
If we are to account for ordinary people’s thinking about justice we need a thicker 
description than the lay/professional distinction.  To characterise that thinking as 
subjective is to grant legal rules an objectivity belied by the existence of courts and 
disputes.  Natural law theory, with its emphasis on human rationality, may provide a 
foundation for conceptualising non-lawyers’ justice reasoning; legal positivism seems 
likely to reject that reasoning as failing to emanate from or contribute to legal rules 
(Gordon, 1999).   
 
To return to the question posed in the title, the lay people in this study seem not to 
consider ignorance of legal rules a barrier to achieving justice.  They have their own 
criteria for evaluating whether they got a fair result; Figure 1 (above) characterises this 
as a complex internal and external negotiation.  As for whether they got justice, most 
conceded mixed feelings: on one hand not ‘absolute justice’; on the other ‘more than 
justice’.  I do not suggest that lay people’s thinking on justice should supplant legal 
rules.  Mediation does, however, offer an opportunity for justice to be co-constructed 
between disputing parties, advisors, mediators, the courts and wider society.   
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